Abstract-There are kinds of multimedia can be accessed conveniently in social networks. Some of multimedia may be used to hiding harmful information. We consider the problem of estimating the stego key used for hiding using least significant bit (LSB) paradigm, which has been proved much difficult than detecting the hidden message. Previous framework for stego key search was provided by the theory of hypothesis testing. However, the test threshold is hard to d ete rm in e. In th is p a p er , w e p ro p o se a n ew m e th o d , in which the correct key can be identified by inspecting the difference between stego sequence and its shifted sequence on the embedding path. It's shown that the new technique is much simpler and quicker than that previously known.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of steganography is to hide information imperceptibly into cover objects, such as digital images. To hide a message, some features of the original image, also called the cover image, which are chosen by a stego key are slightly modified by the embedding technique to obtain the stego image. Before embedding, the message is usually encrypted [1] . Steganography is significant to information security. However, steganographic technique can be used unlawfully by criminals and terrorists, especially in social networks.
Steganalysis aims to break steganography. steganalysis can be classified into two categories: active and passive [2] . The goal of the active steganalysis is to estimate some parameters (stego key, message length etc.) of the embedding algorithm or the hidden message [3] [4] , while passive steganalysis deals with identifying the presence/absence of a hidden message or the embedding algorithm used [5] [6] . In this paper, we investigate active steganalysis since the aim is to estimate the stego key under the assumptions that we already know the steganographic algorithm.
Trivedi et al. [7] [8] presented a method for secret key estimation in sequential steganography. The authors used a sequential probability ratio test to determine the embedding key, which was, in their interpretation, the beginning and the ending of the subsequence modulated during embedding. In fact, sequential embedding is typically used for watermarking. Fridrich et al [9] [10] considered a more typical situation for a steganographic application, in which the key determined a pseudorandomly ordered subset of all indices in the cover image to be used for embedding. They performed chi-square test to estimate the correct key. Unfortunately, chi-square test suffered from the drawback of no simple way to choose the test threshold to attain a desired target performance.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to search the stego key used in LSB steganography. The key can be determined by simple count. In Section II, we include a description of the LSB embedding algorithm. In Section III, we give the definitions used in our method, and then describe the method of identifying the correct key. In Section IV, we give two kinds of experiments. we verify o u r m e t h o d i n t h e f i r s t e x p e r i m e n t a n d s h o w t h e effectiveness of our new method by attacking steganographic software in the second experiment. Finally, we outline some further directions for research. Corresponding author: Liu Jing, email:kimi_liujing@163.com Figure 1 . Movements of each kind of pixels after LSB embedding.
II. LSB STEGANOGRAPHY
H E H O H E M M L O L E L O M
III. PROPOSED METHOD

A. Definitions
To explain the detail of our new technique, we'll first briefly explore the definitions used in our method.
A non-boundary pixel , Iij has eight adjacent pixels in image: ( 1, 1) , ( 1, ) , ,
. The differences between center pixel and its adjacent pixels are denoted by But only four movements, which span different pixel sets, will change the pixel frequencies of set H , L , and M .The four very movements are: Obviously:
The frequency change of H is independent of that of L . Therefore, we only consider the frequency of M pixels. It's apparent that:
Let and be the frequency of "1" and "0" in message bits and be the embedding ratio on the path generated from K , w h i c h c a n b e d e f i n e d a s n path K , where n denotes number of embedded Usually, the message is encrypted, so the message bits are i.i.d. realizations of a binary random variable uniformly distributed on 0,1 , therefore 12 [11] , hence:
We use 0 and j denote the embedding ratio along the correct path and incorrect path respectively. Because the number of embedded message bits along the correct path is , and the number of pixels along correct path is too, the embedding ratio along the path generated from correct key 0 K K is 0 1 . We have 00 10
ZHAI et al. have proved that k D follows Generalized Gaussian distribution with mean "zero" in [11] , therefore:
If the stego image is not fully embedded, the number of embedded message bits along the incorrect path is smaller than , so the embedding ratio along the path generated from incorrect key K j K is smaller than 1, namely 1 j . Thus:
From (5) and (7), we get:
Therefore, the difference between correct key and incorrect key is obtained. By calculating , K, S KK the key K with maximal value of SK can be determined as the correct stego key.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Experiments on Typical Images
We perform some experiments to verify (8 SK is not equal to zero, which is inconsistent with (5).
There are two factors resulting to this. One is that we get (5) and (7) under important assumption that all neighboring pixels are unmodified. However, this is not true in practice since for any payloads, the pixels are chosen with the same probability to the embedding path. The other is that the frequency changes of pixel , ,, HM MH LM ML in practical embedding processing aren't exactly same as that in theory. Despite of the two factors, we find 0 j SK SK holds in all testing images.
We apply the method in [10] to the stego images above, the searching ratio of which is 37 keys per second on a Pentium IV machine running at 3.0GHZ, 512MB, while the searching rate of our method is 115 keys per second.
B. Experiment on Typical LSB Steganographic Software
We conduct this experiment by using "hide and seek 4.1" [12] , which is a popular LSB steganographic software. It uses GIF image containing 320×480 pixels as the cover image and adopts random (num) of Borland C++ 3.1 as the generator. The maximal embedding message length is limited to 19000 byte The initialized state of random (num) is a seed with 16 bits, and "num" is used to control maximal migration step, which is related to message and pixel number that haven't been embedded. So the stego k e y o f H i d e a n d S e e k 4 . 1 c o n s i s t s o f t h e s e e d a n d message length. Therefore, we should recover the seed and the exact length of message.
We convert 1000 images, downloaded from http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/magedatabse/gro undtruth/, into GIF format with 320×480 pixels and insert different length of message using Hide and Seek 4.1. We perform the experiment with our stego key recovery algorithm described as follows.
0. Estimate the embedding ratio using the method presented in [13] and calculate the possible length of secret message min max , . 
If 1 T
, then the seed and the message length in T are declared as the correct seed and length. Otherwise, the algorithm couldn't find any correct key.
Because our algorithm uses the method of [13] to estimate the message length, where the possible deviation for the estimation of embedding ratio is 0.02, 0.02 , the effective length of stego key we should test actually is 2 16 log 0.04 . Table III shows the results of our method, where Pr(succ) means the probability of success, defined as: Pr(succ)=number of images whose stego key is recovered/ total number of images.
From , the number of data is not enough to recovery the stego key, while 1 q , the embedding ratio difference between correct path and incorrect path is so small that the correct key can't be detected. In addition, the embedding message length influences our stego key search ratio most, because all the elements along the path should be calculated. The larger the message length, the slower the search rate. The testing speed is about 43-14500 keys per second.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a novel and simple way in the stego key recovery of LSB steganography which can produce satisfying performance in images.
In the future work, we should consider how to reduce computational time and improve the success ratio in s e arc hi ng s te go key of image s w it h l a rge r o r s m al le r embedding rate. Finally, we should transfer the method into the spatial sequential LSB steganography, whose stego key can be considered as the beginning and the ending of the message during embedding. She is presently a professor with the department of Information Security, Zhengzhou information science and technology institute, Henan, China. She has published 51 research articles and 3 books in these areas.
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